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ARGUMENT
I.

Wilson Has Failed T0 Show That The

District Court’s

Reasonable Suspicion Analysis

Is

Beyond Appellate Review
Wilson ﬁrst argues

and

that the district court’s reasonable suspicion analysis

holding cannot be challenged 0n appeal. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 5-8.) The argument that
the district court’s holding cannot be challenged

This Court “will not hold that a
a party’s position 0n an issue that

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95,

it

trial

is

Without merit.

court erred in

making a decision 0n an

did not have the opportunity t0 address.”

_, 439 P.3d 1267,

1271 (2019). The prosecution, in

m

issue or

its

post-

hearing brieﬁng, speciﬁcally argued that the encounter was initially consensual, but
“[0]nce [the] ofﬁcer had reasonable suspicion he was allowed to extend the stop into a

ﬁlll

DUI investigation to determine whether or not the defendant was operating a motor vehicle
while impaired.” (R.,

DUI

investigation

that position.

investigation

p. 102.)

The record shows

was supported by reasonable suspicion and

The record shows
is

that the state took the position that the

that the issue

the district court addressed

0f reasonable suspicion t0 conduct a

preserved for appellate review.

Wilson’s argument that the

state did

not preserve the argument that the seizure was

justiﬁed by reasonable suspicion 0f DUI confuses two issues:

When the detention occurred,

and whether the detention was supported by probable cause. (Respondent’s
8.)

DUI

He acknowledges

brief, pp. 5-

that the state asserted that reasonable suspicion supported Wilson’s

detention, but because the state argued that detention occurred later in the sequence

0f

events the state forfeited the argument that reasonable suspicion supported a detention that
the district court found occurred earlier. (Respondent’s brief, p. 5.) Wilson’s argument

is

that the state’s position that the ofﬁcer

0f the car”
suspicion

is

had reasonable suspicion “when Mr. Wilson got out

insufﬁcient t0 preserve an argument that the ofﬁcer “possessed reasonable

When he

without merit as

detained

it

originally.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 5.) This

miscomprehends both the

dynamics of a motion

“‘When

him

rules 0f preservation

argument

is

and the underlying

t0 suppress.

a defendant seeks t0 suppress evidence allegedly obtained as a result of an

illegal seizure, the

burden 0f proving that a seizure occurred

V._Pag§, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454,

is

on the defendant.”’

456 (2004) (quoting

m

State V. Reese, 132 Idaho

652, 654, 978 P.2d 212, 214 (1999)). “[T]he government carries the burden ofproving that
the search or seizure in question

203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).
(Ct.

App. 2005)

m

(“It is the State’s

was reasonable.”

State V. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 81

State V. Kimball, 141 Idaho 489, 491, 111 P.3d 625,

627

burden t0 demonstrate reasonable suspicion for a stop”);

Gomez, 136 Idaho 480, 483, 36 P.3d 832, 835

State V.

1,

0f demonstrating that a warrantless detention
suspicion, and thus “reasonable under the Fourth

is

(Ct.

App. 2001)

(state

has burden

based upon objectively reasonable

Amendment”). Here Wilson argued the

detention occurred in the drive-through lane, while the state argued the detention occurred

later, in

the parking

the detention

the state

had

lot.

(R., pp. 85, 101-02.)

was supported by reasonable
t0 prevail

The

state then, as

noted above, argued that

suspicion. (R., p. 102.) Wilson’s argument that

0n the ﬁrst issue (when the detention occurred)

for appellate review the second issue (Whether the detention

in order to preserve

was reasonable)

is

Without

merit.

Indeed, the fact that the district court decided the reasonable suspicion issue after

ruling against the state

0n the detention issue

(R., pp.

119-28) shows that the reasonable

suspicion issue

issue.

was presented

Because the

state

regardless of

0n the reasonable suspicion issue

0n the detention issue demonstrates
the state’s argument.

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho

at

the district court resolved the detention

had the burden 0f showing reasonable suspicion, the

district court directly ruled

by

how

The

after

it

ruled against the state

that the district court believed the issue

district court certainly

fact that the

was presented

had “the opportunity

t0 address,”

_, 439 P.3d 1271, the issue of reasonable suspicion, and in fact

did so.

The

state

argued that the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion. That

argued that the detention happened
ultimately found

by

that the detention

at a different point in the

the district court does not

show

it

sequence 0f events than

that the state did not take the position

was justiﬁed by reasonable suspicion of DUI.

The

determination that the seizure was not supported by reasonable suspicion

district court’s

is

preserved for

appellate review.

II.

The

District Court’s Determination

That The Seizure

Suspicion

A.

Is

Was Not

Supported

BV Reasonable

Erroneous

Introduction

At the time the ofﬁcer seized Wilson by telling him to pull

into the parking lot

once

he had gotten his food, the ofﬁcer (1) knew that a restaurant employee had reported
suspicion that Wilson

Tr., p. 5, L.

17

—

was driving under the inﬂuence

p. 6, L. 1; R., p. 118); (2)

(1/9/19 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 11-18; 4/1 8/19

had seen several empty large (32 ounce) beer

cans in the car (1/9/19 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 9-10; R., p. 118); and (3) smelled a strong odor 0f
alcohol emanating from the car (1/9/19 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 11-14; R., p. 127).

alone in the car

it

would be beyond

cavil that the ofﬁcer

Were Wilson

had reasonable suspicion

t0

Wilson

investigate

for

DUI.

Thus, the only issue presented in this case

is

whether the

presence of additional occupants of the car rendered the ofﬁcer’s suspicion of
constitutionally unreasonable.

The

district court’s

conclusion

it

did

is

DUI

contrary to logic and

applicable legal authority. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-9.)

Wilson argues
suspicion

was

(Respondent’s

“unparticularized.”

respectively, contrary t0 the facts

B.

was engaged

that the ofﬁcer

“ﬁshing expedition” and that his

brief, pp. 9-10.)

These arguments

are,

and contrary to the law.

The Ofﬁcer Was Not Engaged

In

A “Fishing Expedition”

Wilson argues the ofﬁcer was engaged
about the phone

in a

in a

“ﬁshing expedition” because “nothing

[from the restaurant employee] established reasonable suspicion 0f

call

criminal activity,” the ofﬁcer neither smelled alcohol 0n Wilson’s “person” nor detected

nystagmus
restaurant

in his eye

movement

until after the detention,

and neither the ofﬁcer nor the

employee witnessed a “driving pattern.” (Respondent’s

brief, pp. 9-10.)

To

the

extent these claims are accurate, they are incomplete.

The
morning.

restaurant

employee testiﬁed

(4/18/19 Tr., p. 4, L. 21

—

that

he called in a “drunk driver”

p. 5, L. 20.)

The occupants 0f the

at

car

2:30 in the

were “really

laughing,” which the employee took as “a sign 0f something.” (4/18/19 Tr., p.

23.)

When the

for the wait.”

restaurant

1-8.)

(4/18/19 Tr., p.

employee told dispatch

had alcohol

21-

occupants of the car were told that the restaurant was busy and their food

would be delayed, Wilson responded by saying
okay

5, Ls.

5, Ls.

that

that they

had alcohol

in the car “so it’s

19-25; p. 6, Ls. 15-21; p. 9, Ls. 19-22.)

The

he “suspected the person was drunk and that they

in the car, that they said they

had alcohol

in the car.” (4/18/19 Tr., p. 10, Ls.

Contrary to Wilson’s incomplete rendition 0f this evidence, the fact that the police

had a

citizen report

alcohol in his car

0f a potential

was an important

reasonable suspicion 0f DUI.

after

DUI

because he suspected Wilson was drunk and had

When combined

making contact but before

smell 0f alcohol from the vehicle), the ofﬁcer

C.

With the evidence gathered by the ofﬁcer

the detention (several large

but a constitutionally reasonable

showing

part 0f the totality of the circumstances

empty beer cans and the strong

was not engaged

in a

“ﬁshing expedition,”

DUI investigation.

The Ofﬁcer’s Suspicions Were Sufﬁcientlv Particularized
Police must have “a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped

engaged

in

wrongdoing.”

United States

V. Cortez,

449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).

investigatory stop does not deal With hard certainties, but With probabilities.”

Munoz, 149 Idaho

121, 126, 233 P.3d 52, 57 (2010) (internal quotation omitted).

inability t0 exclude other occupants

particularized.

Maryland V.

Pringle,

is

“An

State V.

The mere

of a car does not render suspicion insufﬁciently

540 U.S. 366, 368 (2003); State

V.

Zentner, 134 Idaho

Here the mere possibility

508, 510, 5 P.3d 488, 490 (Ct. App. 2000).

that

Wilson could

have been sober but merely hanging out With drunks did not render the ofﬁcer’s suspicions
of DUI insufﬁciently particularized so as t0 be unreasonable.

Wilson argues

that his “‘presence in

an area of expected criminal

activity, standing

alone,” and his “‘proximity t0 others suspected 0f or associated with criminal
Without more,”

is

not enough t0 support a reasonable particularized suspicion that he was

committing a crime. (Respondent’s

brief, p. 11

_, 450 P.3d 3 15, 322 (2019)).)

Wilson was

near others committing crimes.

He was

restaurant with

activity,

(quoting State V. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667,

not,

however, merely in a high crime area or

in a car in the drive-through lane

of a fast-food

two other people not suspected of committing any crimes.

The ofﬁcer

reasonably believed one or more or

only question

is

all

of the people in that car had been drinking, and the

Whether the presence of passengers eliminated reasonable suspicion that

Wilson was one 0f the people Who had been drinking.

The well-established

rule that

proximity to criminal activity does not alone give rise to reasonable suspicion articulated
in

Gonzalez does not answer that question.
In

Maryland V.

Pringle,

540 U.S. 366, 373 (2003), the Supreme Court 0fthe United

States held that evidence that cocaine

and cash was

in a car occupied

particularly individualized probable cause as t0 all three

t0 the contraband

men

because they

common

in this case t0 infer that

enterprise

among

Wilson was involved

the probable cause in

“it

the three men.” Li.

the others in his car under the facts 0f this case.

more so than

all

in a

“common

It

that

was reasonable
was n0

created

had access

and the evidence did not exclude any one 0f them. The rule

proximity was insufﬁcient did not apply in that case because
ofﬁcer t0 infer a

by three men

mere

for the

less reasonable

enterprise” of drinking With

The reasonable suspicion in this

m1; was not based 0n mere proximity

case,

t0

even

someone

else’s criminal conduct.1

In this case a concerned citizen reported a suspected drunk driver.

The ofﬁcer was

able to corroborate that report With evidence that the interior of the car smelled strongly 0f

an alcoholic beverage and contained multiple empty large beer cans.

This created

reasonable suspicion of DUI, not suspicion that only the passengers had been drinking.

1

that the contraband in the car

490 (Ct. App. 2000), there was even
was a joint enterprise by the car’s occupants,

were engaged

in trying to hide the incriminating evidence.

In State V. Zentner, 134 Idaho 508, 510, 5 P.3d 488,

more evidence

such as evidence that

Wilson tries

all

three

to distinguish

t0 distinguish Pringle.

Zentner based on

(Respondent’s

this additional evidence,

brief, pp. 11-13.)

6

but makes no attempt

The

district court erred in

W

concluding that the presence of passengers in Wilson’s car

negated reasonable suspicion of DUI.

The

state respectfully requests this

Court to reverse the

suppressing evidence and dismissing the felony

district court’s

order

DUI charge.

DATED this 9th day 0f April, 2020.
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Kenneth K. Jorgensen
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Deputy Attorney General
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